Thanks Jonathan, I’m supportive of the idea of DAO governance, but I think it’s beyond the scope of the current MIP which imo is best limited to tokenomics.
1 Like
I agree; however, I think it is helpful to add an expectation that the design (and implementation) should consider which parameters should be able to be managed through a governance process. I am raising it for that purpose, not to turn this into a governance conversation.
Any changes could be implemented in a manner that would require a hard fork to change, or, could be implemented such that key parameters may be changed via governance.
(Even though we don’t have that governance mechanism in existence yet. I’m thinking about things like the supercharged awards being stuck for years waiting on a hard fork; we can avoid things like that in the future if we think about governance up front, and build it in to the design and into the implementation expectations.)
2 Likes
I’m not convinced a MIP is suitable for this.
If there is enough support for researching tokenomics, it should just get done with Foundation support, with the results presented with an actionable MIP. What about a zkIgnite proposal (infra track), which, if gained support, would be funded and also provide clarity to the community about how it was funded?
I’m not sure this issue merits too much research, given the 1 billion tokens already circulating. We’re realistically talking about two major levers we can toggle, which are the block rewards and fee burning. There’s already a reasonable proposal for this based on Evan’s initial outline. Likely, the major effort here is in the implementation of the fee-burning and then any adjustment to this plan based on what we actually see based on network usage.
I think Jonathan’s comments are pertinent as, assuming we are simply dealing with two constants of block rewards and fee burning % (arguably, we could increase the tx limit per block, but that is more of an engineering-based decision), the ability to alter these at a more frequent cadence would be very beneficial.
2 Likes
I think the research part could be on whether there are extra design space outside of the two levers that you mentioned. zkApps are different from the dapps on Ethereum in that the proving cost (gas) on chain is more or less constant no matter the complexity of the computation itself. Mina will also predominantly feature L2s and app-chains for scaling purposes. It’s my hunch that there could be some tokenomics design space to capture these unique properties.
But if @evan or @o1emre would prefer to directly commission the review and then for the community to vote on the outcome of the review, then I’m all for it too. 
1 Like
Hi Jonathan, you might have read @evan 's letter as he transitions from CEO to an advisor role. He mentioned the following which is very much in line of what you said here:
'The second is advising Mina Foundation and its community on governance. Over the last few years, we’ve seen the Mina Ecosystem grow to several companies and many individuals. With the upcoming smart contract upgrade enabling zkApps on mainnet, we can expect the number of companies and individuals needing to collaborate will only continue to grow, requiring further additions to Mina’s existing governance and coordination systems to keep pace.
To address these needs, Mina Foundation has recently established a governance team to support decentralized decision-making, aiming to develop processes that are both authentic to Mina’s participatory approach while delivering effective outcomes. These ideas will be shared with the community and ecosystem as we get closer to and after the upcoming zkApps upgrade. I’m excited to see how this new chapter unfolds for the protocol with good governance.’
2 Likes
Hi Remi,
With the introduction of Core program, I’m wondering whether this one could be a good one to go through that route, as Gareth rightfully pointed out, the inital steps of commisioning the designs does not seem necessary with an MIP. The new flow via the Core route would be: ‘RFC/RFP to redesign Mina tokenomics → getting proposals and designs from Gauntlet/Delphi etc → MIP to vote on the new tokenomics to be integrated onchain’.
what do you think please? @evan @WillCove @teddyjfpender @o1emre? I can work with @Pete to get the initial RFC done if you think this would be viable. Thanks.
1 Like
I’m here to help. Excellent idea and positive step forward. Good work as always Lamps
1 Like
I am bit late to arrive but I have few points I like to draw attention.
After the fork, inflation should be around 8%, while the top chains we are comparing have rates around 7% or even lower. However, they have billions securing their chains. Currently, we don’t even have a billion, and stake participation is low because tokens are mostly concentrated on exchanges or are inactive. If we reduce the rewards percentage too quickly, that would create less stake and a less secure network. In my opinion, these are the areas we should focus on before doing further changes.
1)Stake participation rate and network security (possibly changing parameters here so it would be better because even without a lock we don’t have enough participation)
2)Before fee burning. Focusing on fixing snark marketplace since we expect to have more activity. Currently impact of it nearly 0 considering the chains activity while snark marketplace is problematic since the start and will not improve with activity increase.
3 Likes
I think many people believe that their opinions are important and correct. However, please face reality first. The blockchain industry is fiercely competitive, and the increase in user numbers cannot keep up with the speed of technological iteration. If we stubbornly insist that an inflation rate of more than 8% is good, then we need to look at the essence of the problem. Bitcoin’s inflation requires high costs and faces a continuously decreasing inflation rate. Ethereum’s current inflation is almost flat or even partially burned, surpassing the amount of inflation. Since there are already successful examples out there, why do we still stubbornly cling to high inflation? Even if Mina is the world’s most secure, people are unwilling to participate when they see a high inflation rate, so what use does security have? Aren’t we creating products for more people to use? If we go against this purpose and talk about other things, it can only be counterproductive. High inflation in Mina means that new users are unwilling to passively devalue their assets; this is human nature. If the design goes against human nature, then only speculators and early privileged individuals will remain. Since Bitcoin’s appearance emphasized fairness more and more, Mina should follow this trend to improve itself.
2 Likes
Hi all, this post has been turned into a Core Grant RFC - please continue your input here: RFC-0006: Review and Redesign of Mina's Tokenomics post Hardfork by lampardlamps · Pull Request #10 · MinaFoundation/Core-Grants · GitHub
2 Likes